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ABSTRACT
This study aimed to examine the influence of audit committee characteristics, executive
compensation, and audit complexity towards corporate audit fee. The audit committee
characteristics were examined by the number of its independent member, its size, meetings
frequency and members’ expertise. This study used the data from company’s annual report listed
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The populations of this study werethe companies listed on
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in year 2012-2014. The samples were the non-financial
companies which were selected by purposive sampling through some requirements for gaining the
data in this study. There were 128 companies fulfilled criterias as the research samples. Data
analysis was performed by multiple linear regression analysis method. The results of this study
showed that the independent audit committee members and its meetings frequency had no
significantly influence toward the corporate audit fee. Meanwhile, audit committee member’s
expertise had negative influence to the corporate audit fee. Otherwise, the audit committee size,
executive compensation and audit complexity had positive influences to the corporate audit fee.
Keywords: audit committee, executive compensation, audit complexity, audit fees
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance is a set of corporate controls and rules that arise due to interaction
between parties that manage the company. In other words, corporate governance is a set of actions,
policies, and procedures that create the interests alignment of managers, shareholders, and other
stakeholders (Rustam et al., 2013). One of the corporate governance actions is auditing. The
principles of corporate governance can be explained through agency theory that identifies agency
relationship between principal and agent parties. Agency relationship can be interpreted as
cooperative contract between investor (principal) and management (agent). However, this
relationship may create a conflict of interest between them caused by an information asymmetry.
The information gap creates by the separation of company ownership and the requirement of the
management control to establish the internal and external control and supervision.
Most of corporate scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom, were caused by the managers who
acted for their own interests and made the corporate collapse and loss of shareholder wealth. Since
some scandals have been revealed, audits begin to have important value to corporate governance
evaluation. As the response of the scandal happened, the policymakers in some countries have
made improvements of corporate governance as law or regulation. The 1990s financial crisis, that
hit the economy of Asian countries including Indonesia, emerged initiation in strengthening
corporate management framework for national and regional levels. In a study conducted by the
Asian Development Bank, the financial crisis was affected by the weakness of corporate
governance. It can be said that the Asian crisis became the early milestone for the improvement of
the corporate governance in Asia.
The corporate governance guidelines that formed immediately after the various corporate
scandals put forward the significant role of an audit committee. It seized the public's attention after
the report submission by the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC, 1999). The report provides
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recommendations on the composition and activities of audit committees designed to assist external
auditors and to improve the quality of internal controls. The existence of the audit committee in
Indonesia has been mandated in Financial Services Authority Regulation number 55/POJK.04/2015
on the Establishment and Work Guidelines of the Audit Committee. The characteristics of the audit
committee can be reviewed through several indicators namely, independent members, size,
frequency of meetings, and member expertise.
The audit committee conducts active monitoring the process of financial reporting and
supervises the relationship between company's management and external auditors. As an internal
mechanism, it is required to assist the control and supervision functions in the company. As a
controlling mechanism, executive compensation is used to align the interests between managers
and shareholders. A financial statement is the benchmark of corporate management performance. A
company with high complexity requires a firm control and supervision. As a supervising
mechanism, it is necessary to have a financial statement audit by an independent auditor from
outside the company. For the audit services, an agency cost arises as an audit fee which is based on
the contract between the client company and the external auditor.
The audit committee, the executive compensation, and the audit complexity are the
determinant for the amount of audit fee as had been done in the developed countries. This is
because corporate governance system in the developed countries is steadier and the role of audit
committee is firmer than in developing countries. Yatim et al. (2006) found a positive and
significant influence of the audit committee independency and its meeting frequency toward the
audit fee. Naser and Nuseibeh (2008) stated that the audit fee is determined by the company size,
kinds of the public accounting firm, the audit complexity and the corporate risk. Rizqiasih (2010)
found that the audit committee independency had a positive and significant impact on the audit
fees, while the audit committee size and the audit committee meetings intensity have no effect on
audit fee. Rustam et al. (2013) carried out a significant correlation between the activity and the
audit committee independence and the audit fee, whereas compensation incentive did not affect the
audit fee. In 2013, Hazmi found that the independency, size and intensity of meeting of the audit
committee did not influence the audit fee, while in 2015 Gati observed the audit fee was positively
influenced by the size and intensity of audit committee meetings and negatively impacted by the
committee members' expertise.
This study aimed to examine the influence of audit committee characteristics, executive
compensation and audit complexity towards corporate audit fee. Researchs on audit fee are still
limited because its disclosure tents to be a voluntary, while the determinants of the audit fee
amounts given to the auditor are increasingly diverse.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION
Agency Theory
This theory explains the relationship between agents and principals. In a company, managers
are the agents, while principals are the shareholders. The agents oblige to provide actual
information to the principal, while the principals oblige to reward the agents (Hendriksen and van
Breda, 1991). The manager as an agent has a duty to run the company and report it to the principal.
Meanwhile, the principal is obliged to supervise the manager’s activities and give a reward. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) define agency cost as the sum of money of the principal spent for supervising
agents.
The information gap arises due to the separation of company ownership. It requires forming
internal and external control and supervision. Therefore, it needs an adequate corporate governance
mechanism. The consideration of the corporate governance comes out by referring the agency
theory in which the control and supervision of corporate management must be carried out to ensure
the management performed fulfils the principles of compliance with applicable rules, provisions
and standards. The supervision is done through a contract between the principal and the agent.
Independent supervision requires agency cost, in the form of audit fee. The supervision cost is the
cost of supervising the agent activities whether the agent did regarding the principal interests and
accurately reported all activities that have been assigned to the manager.
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The Influence of the Independent Audit Committee to the Audit Fee
The agency theory explains that there is separation of ownership and control of the company.
An audit committee is required to assist the control and supervision functions in the company. As
the implementation of good corporate governance, the audit committee should be independent. It
starts with the provision that the chairman of the audit committee is from independent
commissioner. As a shareholder representative, an independent commissioner is expected to be
able to act independently of the majority shareholder. Besides, the other audit committee members
as an external professional party must also be independent. In other words, they have no directly or
indirectly business relationship and any familial relationship with the company's boards of
commissioners and directors.
As a control mechanism, the audit committee makes the internal control system stronger and
improves the quality of the financial statements. The independent audit committee provides the
high reliability level of accounting process and the objectivity of the audit committee. According to
Yatim et al. (2006), an independent audit committee is more effective in preventing the risk of
making errors in the financial reporting process. It makes the internal control stronger and reduces
inherent risk level and supervision. Therefore, substantive testing is required to reduce audit fee.
Thus, the hypothesis that is to be tested is:
H1. The independent audit committee negatively affects audit fee.
The Influence of the Audit Committee Size to the Audit Fee
Based on agency theory, the separation of ownership and control of the company leads to a
conflict between shareholders and company management. The shareholders have an information
access to internal company, while management controls the company's operations. Conflict will
arise when corporate governance mechanism is inadequate. The shareholder tries to maximize the
profit while the manager seeks to maximize his personal profit. With his capacity, the manager’s
tendency to manipulate his own profit becomes greater. Information from management that does
not fit with the actual condition is called information asymmetry. In addition, the information
asymmetry causes the shareholder can not get, assess, and interpret all of the information about the
manager opportunistic behavior.
As a monitoring mechanism, the audit committee assists the shareholders in overseeing the
management and reducing the information asymmetry. The Financial Services Authority (2015)
determines that an audit committee consist at least three members from independent commissioners
and the outsider of the company. Raghunandan and Rama (2007) stated that more number of audit
committee members provide more effective supervision so that the company performance becomes
better. It can lessen the task of external auditor. It also makes a better quality of the financial
statement. Effective and efficient audit process may reduce the audit fee. Thus, the hypothesis that
is to be tested is:
H2. The size of the audit committee negatively affects audit cost.
The Influence of the Audit Committee Meeting Frequency to the Audit Fee
The agency theory shows that the audit committee on behalf of the board of commissioners
represents the owners in monitoring the financial reporting process undertaken by managers. The
purpose of this supervision is preventing the managers to conduct an opportunistic behavior that
will inflict a financial loss of the owner. One of managers’ opportunistic behaviors is manipulating
financial report. Therefore, the audit committee that always conducts the meeting will keep
monitoring and supervising the reporting process. The more meetings conducted, the managers
have no change to manipulate financial reporting because they are constantly being audited by the
audit committee (Prasetyo, 2014). The audit committee has duties and be responsible for reviewing
financial information, the compliance of laws, the findings of internal auditors and the
implementation of risk management. Also, it provides independent advice and opinion to the board
of commissioners. Audit committees are authorized to communicate directly with employees,
directors and internal audit functions, risk managements and public accountants regarding their
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duties and responsibilities (Financial Services Authority, 2015). The communication conducted is
in the form of meetings or assemblies held periodically attended more than one-half number of the
members. Financial Services Authority (2015) recommends the number of meetings is at least four
times a year. The audit committee meetings frequency is the number of meetings held by the audit
committee within a year to discuss the issues in the company. The more frequent meetings arranged
will reduce financial fraud and miscellaneous misstatements and influence the audit fee. Thus, the
hypothesis that is to be tested is:
H3. The audit committee meeting frequency negatively affects audit fee.
The Influence of the Audit Committee Members’ Expertise to the Audit Fee
The audit committee is in charge of reviewing the financial information to be released to the
public. Besides, the audit committee also reviews the internal audit findings and supervises its
follow-up to the board of directors. Based on the Financial Services Authority (2015), the main
task of the audit committee is to review financial information issued to the public and its
compliance of the laws and regulations. Shareholders are dependent on information provided by
management. The company's financial information issued becomes a reference in the decision
making by the financial report users. In the implementation of good corporate governance, the audit
committee must have sufficient skills and experience in accounting and finance as well as the
related regulations. Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) specifies the audit committee must have
financial and accounting background. The Financial Services Authority requires to at least one
member of the audit committee has educational background and expertise in accounting and/or
finance. The performance of audit committee will be more effective if its members have experience
in finance and accounting. Xie et al. (in Pamudji, 2009) proved that independent commissioners
and skillful audit committees are able to prevent the tendency of earnings management by the
managers. With the expertise, audit committee members will perform proper audit procedures and
be able to detect risk problems excellently. The lesser audit risk makes the external auditor give a
low audit burden. Thus, the hypothesis that is to be tested is:
H4. The audit committee members’ expertise negatively affects audit fee.
The Influence of the Executive Compensation to the Audit Fee
The agency theory considers the relationship between the owner and the company's
management. The principal gives a trust to the agent who provides his managerial services. Agency
conflict will arise by the motive and interest from the shareholders and managers resulting poor
corporate governance that can degrade the company performance. A good relationship between
shareholders and managers can be bad because of the problem. Therefore, the relationship between
the shareholder and the manager must be controlled in order to improve company performance.
The shareholders can establish good corporate governance mechanisms appropriately such as by
boards of directors, ownership monitoring, compensation executives, and markets for corporate
control, limit the managerial tendencies to manipulate financial numbers and minimize agency
costs of managerial wisdom. Compensation is the services value given by the owners to the
management for their performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Executive compensation is used
to align managers' interests and shareholders. Generally, compensation can be salary, allowance,
facilities, bonuses, and long-term benefits. However, executive compensation raises the tendency
of managers to cheat. Managers can manipulate financial information because they motivated to get
their bonus or compensation at a certain point. Healy's research (1985) and Holthausen et al. (1995)
proved that the bonuses affect the financial reporting process by encouraging managers to
manipulate the earnings in order to earn bonuses. The tendency of managers’ fraudulent actions
makes the quality of financial report less reliable. Therefore, the audit effort becomes greater to
identify the risk of fraud. This will cause the external auditors to make a burden with higher audit
fee. Thus, the hypothesis that is to be tested is:
H5. Executive compensation has a positive influence on audit fee.
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The Influence of the Audit Complexity to the Audit Fee
Financial report serves as a benchmark of a successful management performance in company
operational. The level of reliability and fairness is very important in the process of presenting and
disclosuring the financial report. To improve the quality of financial report requires an auditing
process by professional and independent party. Audit is a service provided by a public accountant
to provide an independent auditor's opinion on the financial statements presented by an entity. In
conducting the audit, the external auditor considers the business complexity of the client. Audit
complexity is a measure of the transaction complexity owned by clients to be audited. The
complexity is based on the number of subsidiaries owned by the company. The subsidiary is
entirely controlled by the main entity because most of its stock has been acquired. El-Gammal
(2012) stated that the number of subsidiaries represents the complexity of the audit. Consolidated
financial statement should be made when the company has a domestic subsidiary. Sandra and
Patrick (1996) revealed that the more number of subsidiaries, the more time and skill are needed to
ensure the accuracy of the consolidated financial report. With some subsidiaries of the client entity,
the financial transactions become increasingly complex. This will make an external auditor to
charge a higher audit fee. Thus, the hypothesis that is to be tested is:
H6. Audit complexity has a positive effect on audit cost.
METHODOLOGY
This study was a statistical-correlation study which tried to identify the influence
correlation among variables using multiple regression analysis. It was used since it was to predict
the value of a variable based on the value of two or more other variables.
Research Variables and Variables Operational Definition
As it was a statistical-correlation study with multiple regression analysis, the variables that
were measured as below:
Table 1
Variable Measurement
Variable Measurement
1 Audit fee The amounts of rupiah by natural logarithm that is disclosed in
the annual report
2 Independent audit
committee
Percentage of independent audit committee members from the
total number of audit committee members
3 Audit committee size Number of the audit committee members stated in the company's
annual report
4 Audit committee
meetings frequency
Number of meetings held by the audit committee during the
reporting year of the minimum meetings obliged to be held by the
Financial Services Authority
5 Audit committee
member expertise
Number of audit committee members who have accounting and/or
financial expertise from the overall number of the audit
committee members
6 Executive compensation The amount of compensation/remuneration by natural logarithm
received by the directors during the reporting year
7 Audit complexity Number of subsidiaries owned by the main entity
Population and Samples
The population in this study was a company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in
2012-2014. The year’s period was used because before the year 2012 some data had not been listed
in the company's annual report. The determination of the sample companies used purposive
sampling method, a sampling method by taking into account of some certain criterias. The criterias
that must be met to be the research samples are as follows:
1. Non-financial company listed on IDX during the period year 2012-2014.
2. The company published its financial report and audited annual report for the December, 31st
ending period.
3. The data should be fully available for all research variables.
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Non-financial corporations were selected as the samples because they were much more than
the financial and simply represented the research undertaken. Also, there was a number of unique
characteristics of financial company and had some difference regulations between financial and
nonfinancial company.
Types and Data Sources
The data used in this study was the secondary data in the form of annual reports and financial
statements of companies that have been audited in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Data were obtained or
downloaded from the website page of Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), the company website
pages, and various other types of reference. The dependent variable data is the amount of the audit
fee obtained from the public accountant information part of the annual report. The audit committee
data, such as the number of independent members, the size, the meeting frequency, and the member
expertise can be seen in the Corporate Governance section of the annual report. It was also for the
executive compensation data were obtained in the Corporate Governance section of the annual
report. The number of subsidiaries data of each sample could be found in the Notes to the Financial
Statements.
Analysis Method
The analytical method used in this study was multiple regression analysis. It was used
since the purpose of research was to identify the influence of more than one independent
variable to one dependent variable. The test was used to recognize the influence of audit
committee characteristics, executive compensation and audit complexity towards audit fee.
The regression equation was as follows:
LNAuditFee =  + 1ACInd + 2ACSize + 3ACMeet + 4ACExp + 5LNExComp + 6SUBS + 
Index:
LNAuditFee = natural logarithm of audit fee
ACInd = independent audit committee
ACSize = audit committee size
ACMeet = audit committee meetings frequency
ACExp = audit committee member expertise
LNExComp = natural logarithm of executive compensation
SUBS = audit complexity
1 - 6 = estimated coefficient
 = error
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Findings
The study finds a positive influence of audit committee size, executive compensation and
audit complexity to the corporate audit fee. Otherwise, there is a negative influence of audit
committee members’ expertise to the corporate audit fee. Meanwhile, there are no influence of
independent audit committee members and audit committee meetings frequency to the corporate
audit fee.
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The criterias of the sample company used as the research objects could be seen in table 2.
Table 2
Object of the Research
No Description 2012 2013 2014 Total
1 Nonfinancial companies listed on the IDX 377 405 420
2 No information on corporate audit fee (284) (277) (256)
3 No independent variable information
Independent audit committee
Audit committee size
Audit committee meetings frequency
Audit committee member expertise
Executive compensation
Audit complexity
-
-
(4)
-
(8)
-
-
-
(3)
(2)
(14)
-
-
-
(8)
(4)
(19)
-
81 109 133 323
Source: The Secondary Data, 2017
Summary of descriptive statistics on audit fee, audit committee characteristics, executive
compensation and audit complexity are presented in Table 3.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistical Data Analysis
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean StandardDeviation
LNAuditFee 301 18.035 24.173 20.439 1.199
ACInd 301 0.67 1.00 0.973 0.082
ACSize 301 3.00 6.00 3.236 0.601
ACMeet 301 1.00 14.25 2.086 2.016
ACExp 301 0.25 1.00 0.619 0.229
LNExComp 301 19.494 25.859 23.026 1.185
SUBS 301 1.00 7.55 2.730 1.495
Source: The Secondary Data, 2017
The regression analysis in the model is based on the dependent variable and independent
variables. As discussed previously, the audit fee is the dependent variable used in this study. The
independent variables in the study are measures of audit committee characteristics, executive
compensation and audit complexity. Multiple regression analyses are performed to test all the
hypotheses for the models of the study. The results of multiple regression analysis for independent
variables with log of audit fee are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Multiple Regression Analysis Results
Variable Hypothesis Coefficient Significance
ACInd H1- -0.358 0.599
ACSize H2- 0.513 0.000*
ACMeet H3- -0.030 0.258
ACExp H4- -0.414 0.039**
LNExComp H5+ 0.540 0.000*
SUBS H6+ 0.195 0.000*
R-squared 0.587
Adjusted R-squared 0.579
F-statistic 69.695 0.000*
*)Significant 0.01
**)Significant 0.05
Source: The Secondary Data, 2017
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Discussions
The study aimed to examine the relationship and influence of the independent variable to the
dependent variable. This study was using multiple regression analysis method with a level of
significance of 5%. If the significance level more than 0.05, then the independent variables does
not have an effect on the dependent variable, and the hypothesis is rejected. In contrast, when the
level of significance is less than 0.05, then the independent variables have effect on the dependent
variable, and the hypothesis is accepted. The findings of the study were then discussed one by one,
as follows:
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis stated that the independent audit committee negatively affects the audit
fee. Based on the result of multiple linear regression analysis, the coefficient of independent audit
committee variable was -0.358 with probability significance value of 0.599. It could be concluded
that the first hypothesis was rejected because it was not significant. Therefore, it could be
interpreted that the number of independent audit committee members did not affect audit fee. This
result was supported by the researchs of Hazmi (2013) which found the independent audit
committee has no effect on audit fee. It did not effectively reduce the risk of fraud and fraudulent
financial report. Forming the audit committees may only be done to fulfil the Financial Services
Authority Regulation Number 55/POJK.04/2015 which requires the audit committee should be
from independent commissioners and external parties.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis showed that the size of the audit committee has a negative effect on
audit fee. Based on the result of multiple linear regression analysis, the coefficient value of the
audit committee size variable was 0.513 with a probability significance value of 0.000. It could be
concluded that the second hypothesis was rejected because the coefficient was positive. Therefore,
it could be interpreted that the audit committee size had a positive effect on the audit fee. It
indicates the greater number of audit committee members made the audit fee higher. This happened
because the audit committee on behalf of the board of commissioners represented the owners
preferred the high quality external auditors. This result differed from Yatim, et al. (2006), Rizqiasih
(2010) and Hazmi (2013) suggested that the audit committee size has no significant effect on audit
fee.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis indicated a positive influence of the audit committee meeting frequency
to the audit fee. Based on the result of multiple linear regression analysis, the variable coefficient of
the audit committee meeting frequency was -0.030 with probability significance value of 0.258. It
could be concluded that third hypothesis was rejected because it was not significant. This result
supported Rizqiasih’s research (2010) which observed the frequency of audit committee meeting
has no effect on the audit fee. This happened because the audit committee had not been maximally
carrying out its duties and responsibilities so that its role and functionwas not effective. This might
be occurred due to the audit committee meeting findings did not get follow up from the board of
commissioners.
Hypothesis 4
The fourth hypothesis denoted the negative effect of the audit committee members’ expertise
on audit fee. Based on the result of multiple linear regression analysis, the variable coefficient of
the audit committee members’ expertise was -0.414 with the probability significance value of
0.039. It could be concluded that the fourth hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it could be
interpreted that the audit committee members’ expertise negatively affected the audit fee. It
indicates that the large number of audit committee members who have financial and accounting
expertise made the audit fee lower. With financial and accounting expertise, the audit committee
members were able to detect wrong and risk audit procedures better so it reduced the audit fee. This
result supported Gati's study (2015) that showed the negative impact of the audit committee
members' expertise on audit fee.
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Hypothesis 5
The fifth hypothesis stated that the executive compensation had a positive effect on audit fee.
Based on the result of multiple linear regression analysis, the variable coefficient value of the
executive compensation was 0.540 with a probability significance value of 0.000. It could be
concluded that the fifth hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it could be interpreted the executive
compensation had a positive effect to audit fee. It indicates that the compensation was received by
the directors made the higher audit fee. The greater compensation was received by the executive
made the higher risk of the manager fraud in multiplying the bonus. The results of this study were
identical with the research of Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) and Wysocki (2010) who claimed that
the executive compensation had a significantly positive effect on the audit fee.
Hypothesis 6
The sixth hypothesis indicated the positive effect of the audit complexity to the audit fee.
Based on the result of multiple linear regression analysis, the variable coefficient value of the audit
complexity was 0.195 with significance value 0.000. It could be concluded that the sixth hypothesis
was accepted. Therefore, it could be interpreted that audit complexity had a positive effect on audit
fee. It indicates that audit complexity made the higher audit fee. The more subsidiaries the more
complex of the consolidated main entity report made the external auditors charged the higher audit
fee. This result encouraged the findings of Naser and Nuseibeh (2008) and Nugrahani (2013) that
the audit complexity positively and significantly affected the audit fee.
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusions
This study aimed to examine the influence of audit committee characteristics, measured by
the independency, size, meeting frequency, and member expertise audit committee, executive
compensation and audit complexity towards audit fee. The samples of this research were
nonfinancial companies listed on IDX in 2012, 2013, and 2014 selected by using purposive
sampling method. Based on the findings and the discussion that have been described previously, it
could be summarized as follows:
1. The independent audit committee had no influence on audit fee. Thus, it could be
concluded that the first hypothesis was rejected.
2. The size of the audit committee had a positive effect on audit fee. Thus, it could be
concluded that the second hypothesis was rejected.
3. The frequency of audit committee meetings did not affect audit fee. Thus, it could be
concluded that the third hypothesis was rejected.
4. The expertise of audit committee members negatively affects the audit fee. Thus, it could
be concluded that the fourth hypothesis was accepted.
5. Executive compensation has a positive effect on audit fee. Thus, it could be concluded that
the fifth hypothesis was accepted.
6. The audit complexity had a positive effect on audit fee. Thus, it could be concluded that the
sixth hypothesis was accepted.
Limitations
Some limitations in the study include:
1. This study used the audit fee data that were still voluntary disclosure so it had not reached
all sectors of the companies.
2. The executive compensation data in the study was proxied with the total received
remuneration. It was not clarified whether the executive compensation was the short-term
compensation in the form of salary, allowances, and bonuses or the long-term
compensation in the form of stock option, performance achievement plan and other long-
term benefits.
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Suggestions
The suggestions for further research are as follows:
1. Good corporate governance practices were not assessed merely by an audit committee. The
principles of corporate governance should also be considered.
2. The value of coefficient determination (adjusted R square) in the study was 57.9%, which
means there are 42.1% other factors that are not examined. The other determinants should
be considered towards the audit fee.
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